

















World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3809, January 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even 
if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be 
cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of 
the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. 
 
                                                 
1 The research results presented here are part of a broader research project on “Trade Facilitation 
and Economic Growth: The Development Dimension” in the Development Economics Research 
Group – International Trade team of the World Bank.  The project is funded through a Trust Fund 
established by the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) to explore the impact of 
trade costs and barriers on development.  The findings and conclusions here do not necessarily 
represent the views of U.K. government or DFID. 
2Department of Economics, George Washington University, 1922 F Street, NW, Suite 208, 
Washington, DC 20052; Email: xchen@gwu.edu. 
3Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, 1-31 Machikaneyama-cho, 
Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan; Email: otsuki@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp. 




















































































































Standards and technical regulations are an increasingly prominent part of 
the international trade policy debate.  In particular, there has been 
considerable discussion of whether standards and regulations affect trade 
costs and export prospects for developing countries.  In this paper, we 
examine how meeting foreign standards affects firms’ export performance, 
reflected in export propensity and market diversification. The analysis 
draws on the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey database of 
619 firms in 17 developing countries. Our results indicate that standards 
and technical regulations in developed countries do affect firms' propensity 
to export in developing countries. In particular, testing procedures and 
lengthy inspection procedures by importers reduce exports by 9% and 3%, 
respectively. Furthermore, in our model, the difference in standards across 
foreign countries causes diseconomy of scale for firms and affects decisions 
about whether to enter export markets. The empirical analysis presented 
here implies that standards impede exporters' market entry, reducing the 
likelihood of exporting to more than three markets by 7%. In addition, we 
find that firms that outsource components are more challenged by 




Export success and the ability to enter international trade markets are increasingly critical 
to job creation and poverty alleviation in developing countries.   Determining what factors 
drive export performance, as part of achieving these goals, is clearly important.  While 
there has been a significant decline in explicit trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas over 
the past decades, standards and technical regulations are increasingly mentioned as a factor 
driving trade costs.  This is particularly true for firms in developing countries.  Studies 
conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),  for 
example, have shown that some developing countries have suffered considerable export 
losses due to their inability to respond to restrictive and duplicative environmental 
standards and regulations imposed in developed countries.
5  Such  environmental 
requirements cover a broad spectrum of instruments and include product-content 
standards, mandatory and voluntary labeling, testing and certification procedures. The 
rising challenge in meeting complex technical regulations by exporters has also led to a rise 
in trade disputes centering on these issues.  As such, we are interested in examining based 
on empirical data, how standards and technical regulations affect developing country 
firms’ export performance. 
 
In this paper, we define a firm’s export performance in two dimensions: export propensity 
(the overall export share), and market diversification (the total number of export markets 
entered by a firm). A number of previous studies have focused on total exports and the 
factors driving export success for firms.  For example, Glejser et. al (1980) explore how 
export performance, i.e., export share of individual firms in export markets, is related to 
firm size, location, information, foreign subsidiaries, and market structures.  The number 
of empirical studies explaining firms’ decision on the number of export markets to enter is 
limited.   Efforts to diversify export markets are clearly a crucial strategy, however, for 
firms to respond to international risk, such as export price uncertainty and other factors.  In 
fact, Hirsch and Lev (1971) find that sales stability and market diversification are 
                                                 
5For example, the Study of the Effects of Environmental Measures on Market Access from India in 
its communication to the WTO noted that it has become a great concern to their exporting firms to 
meet the existing standards on industries such as textiles, leather products, and packaging that 4 
positively correlated. Furthermore, as competition in popular export destinations 
intensifies it is critical for firms to consider entry into new export markets.  As Eaton, 
Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) point out and we observe in this paper, the number of firms 
selling to three or more markets is negatively correlated with the number of export 
destinations. 
 
Research that has examined firms’ export decisions, including Dixit (1989a,b), Krugman 
(1989) and others, suggests that these decisions are driven in part by sunk costs in entering 
a particular export market.  A number of studies have focused on firms in developing 
countries, including Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004), and 
examine empirically factors affecting decision-making such as entry costs that influence a 
firm’s export behavior.  Roberts and Tybout (1997) test for the presence and magnitude of 
sunk costs using a sample of Colombian plants, while Bernard and Jensen (2004) test for 
the possible existence of entry costs by looking at the effects of exporting yesterday on 
exporting today. Both papers find entry cost significant in explaining firms' export 
decisions.  
 
In this paper, we introduce the role of standards and technical regulations in explaining a 
firm’s export performance.  Standards and technical regulations affect both dimensions of 
export performance for a number of reasons. First, governments have the ability to set 
standards based on domestic firms' product characteristics or technology capacity. This can 
raise foreign exporters' costs to accommodate these requirements. Second, there often 
exists a great difference in standards across markets each of which requires an individual 
fixed compliance cost such as the redesign cost.  Hence, the difference in regulations 
across markets can severely limit a firm's scale production capacity and affect a firm’s 
decision in the number of export markets. Third, besides complying with standards and 
technical regulations, firms often experience time delays in procedures such as the 
inspection process and difficulty in accessing standards-related information.  These 
inefficiencies may constitute significant implicit barriers to exporting firms. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
differ significantly across markets. 5 
Hence, we examine the above potential channels through which standards and technical 
regulations affect firms’ export behavior and quantify, both analytically and empirically, 
their impact on firms’ export propensity as well as market diversification. We first consider 
standards as the provision of public goods as in Fischer and Serra (2000), and model how 
the compliance with standards imposes additional costs on producers. Following Baldwin 
(2001) and Ganslandt and Markusen (2001), we also assume that meeting a standard in 
each export market requires an individual fixed cost to establish the capacity and 
subsequently variable production cost. The requirement of a single fixed cost in each 
market, arising from the differences in technical requirements across markets, endogenizes 
a firm's export decisions and the total number of markets to enter. Therefore, when the 
compliance with the standards and technical regulations in developed countries imposes 
significant additional costs on firms and impedes their ability to export, these firms’ overall 
propensity to export and likelihood to diversify their markets will inevitably decrease 
considerably. 
 
We then proceed to estimate the hypotheses established in the model using the World Bank 
Technical Barriers to Trade Survey (2002) as our data source.  As far as we know, there are 
only two empirical studies that have investigated the role of standards in trade, Swann, et al 
(1996) and Moenius (1999). The former uses simple counts of standards to measure the 
effective stock of technical specifications and finds that British exports are raised by this 
measurement of British national standards. The latter paper concludes that bilaterally 
shared standards raise trade volume significantly. However, there is still relatively little 
known about how standards and technical regulations affect individual firms, in particular, 
their export decisions. 
 
The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey (2002) enables such analysis by 
eliciting systematically firm-level information on their production and export activities, 
cost structures, impediments to domestic sales and exports, and compliance with standards 
and technical regulations. The surveys were administered to 619 firms in 17 developing 
countries from five regions, including Eastern Europe, Latin America, Middle East, South 6 
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
6  The 619 firms in the survey vary significantly in 
characteristics such as the value of sales, the size of employment, age and ownership 
structure. This survey collects firms’ responses to a series of questions on topics including 
mandatory standards, conformity assessment (testing, certification, labeling requirements 
and inspection), and their effect on their cost of production and ability to export. Maskus, 
Otsuki, and Wilson (2004) estimate a translog cost function based on the survey data and 
find that standards increase firms’ short-run production cost by requiring additional labor 
and capital. 
 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of standards and technical regulations in determining 
firms' export performance reflected in export propensity and market diversification. We 
begin with estimating whether the existence of these technical requirements deter firms' 
overall propensity to export. Our estimates suggest that testing procedures reduce export 
share by 9%. In particular, domestically owned firms tend to export 16% less of their total 
sales because of testing procedures. Both testing procedures and lengthy inspection 
processes cause a larger adverse impact on agricultural firms which produce highly 
perishable goods. Information barriers, on average, reduce firms' propensity to export by 
18%. We then find that meeting standards also hinders firms' entry into foreign markets, 
reducing the likelihood for firms to export to more than three markets by 7%. Moreover, 
firms which import inputs from abroad are much less likely to diversify their export 
markets, because importing inputs from numerous locations (in which inputs are produced 
without the ultimate destination in mind) makes compliance with multiple standards more 
difficult. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a simple model of a 
firm’s export decision taking into account both fixed and variable costs of meeting 
standards and technical regulations, and determine firms' share of export and number of 
markets. Next, following the description and discussion of data in section 3, we estimate 
the impact of standards and technical regulations on firms' export propensity in section 4. 
In section 5, we present our estimated impact of technical requirements on firms' export 
                                                 
6A detailed description of this survey can be found in Wilson and Otsuki (2003). 7 
decisions and market diversification. We conclude with policy implications from the 
results in section 6. 
 
2. The Model 
With a simple model, we analyze a profit-maximizing firm's export behavior by modeling 
its decision to export to a set of differentiated markets. Suppose the world consists of N 
importing countries, labeled as  j=1, 2, ..., N. Each importing country imposes varied 
standards and technical requirements on the good that is marketed in its market, such as 
emission standards and regulations, to reduce the negative externality arising from 
consumption, such as pollution. Because of the nature of the standards as the provision of a 
public good, a firm’s compliance with the standards has no effect on consumers’ demand 
for the regulated product.
7   
 
The compliance with each country's technical requirements implies a differentiated fixed 
cost to the firm, denoted by ij j i FFD ≡+.  The first component of this fixed cost,  j F , is 
the common fixed cost to comply with the technical regulations imposed in country j, 
which is identical across exporters.  The second component,  i D , represents the firm-wise 
deviation from j F  due to the varied impact each firm receives from standards and technical 
regulations.
8  i D   varies across exporters due to their difference in factors such as 
technology endowment and hence the ability to meet standards. Because standards across 
markets can simply differ in the content of the norm (referred as horizontal standards such 
as a standard on permissible electric plug) instead of the strictness of the norm (referred as 
vertical standards such as the nutrition standard) or just be duplicative (such as repetitive 
testing and certification procedures), we assume, as in Baldwin (2001), that a fixed 
                                                 
7 We realize there also exist some product standards, such as safety standards, that are targeted at 
reducing market failures such as information asymmetry between producers and consumers, in 
which case firms’ compliance, by contrast, would affect consumers’ demand. 
8An example of  i D  is the remodeling cost, which depends on a firm's ability to accommodate 
foreign design requirement. Firms with established platforms that may be modified slightly to 
accommodate foreign markets will involve a very small amount of  i D  . 8 
compliance cost for each market is inevitable.
9   Furthermore, we assume that  j F  is 
uniformly distributed as follows: 
~0 , . j FU N I F F
− ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦  
Subsequently, producing the product that complies with the standards and technical 
regulations also requires a variable cost  (|) , ii cZ q where  i Z  measures  firm  i's 
characteristics, such as size, productivity, and ownership structure, that may be correlated 
with its variable production cost and hence export behavior. 
 
To prove its compliance with the standards imposed in a foreign market (such as inspection 
process) takes a certain amount of time, denoted by T. We assume that the firm produces at 
the profit-maximizing level of exports,  i q
∗ , at price  i p  for each market once it enters a 
foreign market. Provided that standards considered in this model are imposed to reduce 
consumption externality,  i p   is independent of the standards in country i. In a 
representative export market j, firm i receives its expected profit  
[] (|) ij i i i i ij E pq c Zq F πβ
∗∗ = ⋅⋅− − 
where 
tT
T ed t e
ρ ρ βρ
∞ −− ⎡⎤ ≡= ∫ ⎣⎦   reflects the probability that the revenue is realized 
between T and L . 
 
If the profit from selling market j as defined in equation (2) is nonnegative, firm i will 
export to market j. The export status of firm i to market j is thus given by  ij Y ,  where 
1 if  0










Recall  ij F  (j=1, 2, …, N) is uniformly distributed in  [, ] ii D DF
−
+ , so we can identify 
^
i F  at 
which level the firm makes zero profit: 
                                                 
9 This assumption basically rules out the possibility that firms choose to meet the strictest standard 
when selling to multiple markets whose standards only vary with the stringency level and avoid the 
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Furthermore, 
^
i F  pins down the market set firms decide to export to, characterized as 
{ }
^
| i ii k A kF F ≡≤  
and  1 ij Y =   . i j A ∀∈   The number of exporting destinations in the choice subset, denoted as  
,
i jA ii j nY
∗
∈ ≡ ∑   is therefore determined by  
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From the above equation, a negative impact received by firm i on its ability to export, when 
complying with standards imposed in foreign markets, indicates  0 i D >  and leads to a 
smaller number of markets it exports to at equilibrium. A longer time delay before a firm 
accesses its markets, i.e., a larger T which decreases the value of β, also restrains firms 
from entering multiple markets. 
 
The total export amount by the firm, defined as  ,
i
f
jA ii j Qq ∈ ≡ ∑   is characterized as  
[ ] . ) | (
∗ ∗ ∗
−
∗ ∗ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = = i i i i i i i i
f
i q D q Z c q p
F
N
q n Q β  
In addition to exporting to the chosen set of foreign countries, the firm produces for its 
local market as well. We assume that the production for the local market is subject to 
minimum technical regulations, and thus ensures the entry decision by the firm without any 
uncertainty. Thus, the export share,  i ES
∗, is obtained by scaling 
f




∗ +   Factors, which determine a firm's export, including standards, technical 
regulations, and time delay, would have similar influence on a firm's export share, i.e., 
propensity to export. 
 
The rest of the paper quantifies how the presence of standards and technical regulations 
affects the two indicators of export performance: export propensity and market 








The data used in this paper is supplied by the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade 
Survey, the first attempt to investigate the impact of technical requirements at the firm 
level. The survey solicits input from 619 firms in 25 agricultural and manufacturing 
industries located in 17 developing countries regarding technical barriers encountered in 
developed export markets. The 17 developing countries from which the data were collected 
are Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile,  Czech Republic, Honduras, India, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. The 
five export markets include the EU, USA, Canada, Japan and Australia. 
 
One of the central questions this survey seeks to explore is whether standards and technical 
regulations imposed in many developed countries pose barriers to trade for exporters in 
developing countries.  The survey collects participating firms’ responses to a series of 
questions, which are specifically designed to investigate whether technical requirements, 
ranging from quality standard, testing/certification procedure, labeling requirement, to 
conformity assessment, affect developing country firms’ ability to export.  The compliance 
with each of these requirements potentially requires firms to incur additional cost of 
production, such as product redesign cost and additional labor for testing and certification. 
Predictably, firms subject to significant compliance cost are more likely to be affected in 
their ability to export and subsequently their performance in their export markets.  The 
purpose of this paper, therefore, is to identify the impact of existing standards and technical 
regulations imposed by developed countries on firms’ export performance measured by 
export share and number of export markets. 
 
3.1 Description 
In order to explain these two indicators of export performance, we construct a vector of 
variables, denoted by   [] im i Xx ≡  , based on a selection of interview questions, conducted in 
the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey, inquiring whether firms have 11 
perceived effect of standards and technical regulations on their ability to export. 
mi x consists of: 
•  Standards: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when respondents answer Yes to the 
question "Have quality/performance standards impacted your ability to export 
product?", and 0 when they answer No. 
•  Testing procedures: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when respondents answer Yes 
to the question "Have testing procedures impacted your ability to export product?", and 
0 when they answer No. 
•  Labeling requirements: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when respondents answer 
Yes to the question "Have labeling requirements impacted your ability to export 
product?", and 0 when they answer No. 
•  Information inquiry difficulty: an average across export markets of a firm's Yes/No 
answers to the question "Do you have difficulty obtaining information about applicable 
regulations in the countries listed below?”
10 
 
The construction of these binary variables based on the above set of questions enables us to 
identify the existence of the impact of foreign standards and technical regulations across 
firms.  Moreover, the questions’ uniform format allows us to compare the impact among 
the different types of standards and technical regulations.
11  By estimating the effect of 
these binary variables respectively on firms’ export share and number of export markets, 
we directly quantify the significance and magnitude of such impact reflected on export 
performance.  In addition, we include the variable "inspection time", denoted by   , i T   to 
represent the delay from inspection process: 
•  Inspection time: an average across export markets of a firm's answers to the question 
                                                 
10 When firms answered “No” to one or more of these questions, the additional cost arising from 
complying with those particular standards and technical regulations might not be significant 
relative to their production cost incurred to supply only their domestic market.   
11 There exists an alternative set of questions in the survey that solicits firms’ response on “how 
important has each of these technical requirements been in your ability to increase exports to the 
countries?”.  However, first, the content of this set of questions seems less direct and thus suitable 
for our analysis.  Furthermore, since firms answer the question by choosing among “not at all 
important”, “somewhat important”, “important”, “very important”, and “not applicable”, we are 12 
"How many days does the conformity assessment -- inspection usually take?" Firms 
answer the question by choosing from 6 categories, with 0 = “1 day or less”, 1 = “2-4 
days”, 2 = “5-6 days”, 3 = “7 days”, 4 = “8-13 days”, and 5 = “more than 14 days”.
12 
 
Table 1: The summary of statistics for variables on standards and technical regulations 
Variable No.  of  Observation Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Standards 619  0.58  0.49  0  1 
Testing procedures  619  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Labeling requirements  619  0.32  0.46  0  1 
Information inquiry difficulty  570  0.79  0.37  0  1 
Inspection time  243  1.11  1.23  0  5 
 
The statistics of the above variables are summarized in Table 1.  Furthermore, we follow 
Robert and Tybout (1997), Bernard and Jensen (2004), and employ the relevant 
characteristics of firms as additional variables that may explain firms’ export behavior: 
•  Size: we adopt both material expenditure and total employment to measure a firm's 
size. Pervious studies, such as Bernard and Jensen (2004), find that a larger firm tends 
to be more likely to succeed in export. 
•  Wage: we use the wage rate as the unit labor cost. 
•  Ownership structure: the share of foreign ownership is included to characterize a firm's 
ownership structure. 
•  Age: we also consider the number of years a firm has been established as a control 
variable, although the relation between age and exports is ambiguous. Older plants 
might be more experienced with international trade, while newer plants may use 
relatively modern technology to increase productivity and product quality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
concerned with the potential endogeneity of the control variables that are constructed based on this 
set of questions.  
12 Limited by the choice categories of this survey question, the variable, “inspection time”, is 
positively but not linearly correlated with the actual number of days for conformity assessment.  13 
3.2 An example 
In this subsection, we provide a simple example of the correlation between technical 
regulations and market diversification. Figure 1 plots the distribution of firms with respect 
to the number of export markets, by comparing those whose abilities to export have been 
impacted by standards with the rest. The horizontal axis represents the number of export 
markets reflecting firms’ market diversification, while the vertical axis represents the 
percentage of firms within one group ("standards"=1 or "standards"=0) exporting to a 
certain number of markets. 
 
First, the percentage of firms that exports to multiple markets declines with the number of 
markets in general. Second, a larger percentage of firms whose abilities have been 
impacted by standards, exports to two or fewer markets than those whose abilities have not 
been impacted. Third, in great contrast, when we examine more than two export markets, 
the percentage of firms exporting to multiple markets is greater in the group that does not 
receive impact from standards, with only one exception (when the number of markets is 
five). This figure seems to suggest that foreign standards impede market entry, and firms 












Figure 1: The distribution of firms in market diversification 
 






























In this section, we first examine the effects of compliance with standards and technical 
regulations, along with firms' conventional characteristics, on firms' propensity to export. 
Then, we identify the types of firms that receive a larger impact by individually 
investigating groups of interest. 
 
4.1 What matters to export propensity? 
As established in section 2, the total export amount by the firm is characterized as  
[ ] . ) | (
∗ ∗ ∗
− ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = i i i i i i
f
i q D q Z c q p
F
N
Q β  
Recall that  i D  reflects firm-level deviation in compliance cost, led to by the impact of 
standards and technical regulations on an individual firm's ability to export. We estimate 
the share of export relative to total sales of the form, by scaling the total export amount 
with total sales to avoid the problem of endogeneity, in the form of: 
. i i i i i Z T X D ES ε δ γ λ + + + ⋅ + =  
Recall that  [ ] im i X x ≡   denotes a vector of variables representing the status (Yes/No) or the 
extent of respondents' received impact on the ability to export from "standards", "testing 
procedures", "labeling requirements", and "information inquiry difficulty".  [ ] m Dd ≡  
denotes the vector of coefficients.  i DX ⋅   quantifies the effects vector of the above 
technical regulations on an individual firm's export share. For instance, when a firm's 
ability to export is affected by standards, i.e.,  mi x (≡ “ standards”)  = 1,  mm i m dx d =  
measures the magnitude of reduction in its export share if  m d  shows up negative. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares is not suitable because it does not take into account that export 
share is bounded between zero and one. Instead, we proceed the estimation using the 
Generalized Linear Model proposed by Papke and Woolridge (1996), which is especially 
developed to deal with percentage variables. Throughout the analysis, we include the 
region fixed effect to capture the factors related to a firm’s region of origin that may 
explain its export propensity (such as regional trade agreement), and the industry fixed 
(8) 
(9) 15 
effect to control for the industry-specific factors (such as labor intensity).
13  
 
Table 2: The impact of standards and technical regulations 
on export propensity 










Information inquiry difficulty 
     -0.18*** 
(0.06) 
Inspection time 
     -0.03*** 
(0.01) 















Number of observations  207 
Log likelihood  -40.40 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*** represents 5% significance level; ** represents 10%; * represents 15%. 
 
Estimation results are reported in Table 2. Firms whose abilities to export have been 
impacted by testing procedures have an export share nearly 9 percentage points lower than 
                                                 
13 The region fixed effect considers the five regions in which firms of this survey are located, 
including East Europe, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Sah. 
Africa.  The industry fixed effect consider the industries defined at the SIC one-digit level. 16 
the rest of the firms. This result is not surprising. According to the OECD Global Forum 
Workshop on Environmental Requirements and Market Access held in 2002, developing 
country participants expressed concerns that both voluntary and regulatory testing and 
certification programs may not be taking local market conditions and capacities into 
account, which they perceived as a barrier to export to developed country markets. 
 
The variable “information inquiry difficulty” in major export destinations causes firms to 
export 18% less of their total sales. The length of inspection turns out to significantly 
reduce firms' incentives to export. The roles of standards and labeling requirements, 
however, seem ambiguous in determining the export share. A plausible explanation may be 
firms consider the compliance with some standards (such as nutrition or safety standards) 
and labeling requirements, even though raising production cost, also serves as a positive 
signal to consumers, whereas testing procedures, difficult information access, and lengthy 
inspection process only indicate additional cost without deriving any benefit.
14 Therefore, 
the overall impact of these types of standards and labeling requirements on firms’ export 
propensity is ambiguous as suggested in Table 2, while the impact of testing procedures, 
information inquiry difficulty, and lengthy inspection process is unambiguously negative.  
 
The firms' fundamental characteristics do not show up significantly except firms' age, 
indicating that younger firms have a stronger tendency to export relative to older firms.  
However, there is no clear correlation relating firms' other characteristics, such as size, 
wage rate, and foreign ownership, to export share. 
 
4.2 How does the impact on export propensity vary? 
After finding the negative effect technical regulations pose, both explicitly and implicitly, 
on firms’ propensity to export, we investigate how such effect varies across different types 
of firms.  
                                                 
14 For simplicity, the model of this paper considers technical requirements (such as emission 
standards or testing/certification procedures) that only raise costs to firms.  However, it is intuitive 
to understand that, for many other technical requirements such as safety standards and labeling 
requirement, there exist both benefit and cost to complying firms, and therefore it is less clear 
which of these two effects dominates.  17 
 
First of all, we explore whether the absence of foreign ownership would expose firms to a 
larger adverse effect or, equivalently, whether the existence of foreign ownership would 
stimulate firms’ propensity to export. Since the majority of our sample is domestically 
owned firms and there is no sufficient data on firms with any foreign ownership, we only 
estimate equation (9) for the former and report the results in the second column of Table 3.  
By comparing the estimation results on domestically owned firms with those on pooled 
data described in Table 2, we notice that the coefficient on the variable “testing 
procedures” rises considerably, suggesting that testing regulations are a more critical 
concern to firms that are completely domestically owned.  The increase in the magnitude of 
the coefficient on “information inquiry difficulty” seems to indicate that firms without any 
foreign ownership are more bothered with the access to technical requirements 
information. In the meantime, the effect of lengthy inspection becomes insignificant to this 
group of firms.   
 
Second, we are also interested in how the impact of standards and technical regulations 
varies across industries and whether a certain industry is more sensitive to a particular type 
of technical requirements. Again, because most of the firms in our sample are 
manufacturing firms, we could only estimate equation (9) on these firms and summarize 
the results on the third column of Table 3. Similarly, when we compare the third column of 
Table 3 with the main results described in Table 2 with pooled data, we find that the 
estimated effect of “informational inquiry difficulty” on export propensity is greater for 
manufacturing firms. Younger firms are found to be even more eager to export in the 
manufacturing industry. However, the loss of significance of the coefficients on “testing 
procedures” and “inspection time”, found in the last column of Table 3, seems to suggest 
that it is mainly the non-manufacturing (mostly agricultural) firms in the pooled sample 
whose export propensity is challenged by the testing procedures and lengthy inspection 
process. This finding is not surprising provided that agricultural firms produce perishable 
products whose value is more sensitive to any delay that occur in testing and inspection 
procedures. 
 18 
5. Standards and Technical Regulations on Market Diversification 
We now turn to the analysis of estimating the potential presence of scale diseconomy, 
arising from the difference in standards across export markets, by quantifying the impact of 
standards and technical regulations on the number of export markets firms choose to enter. 
 
Table 3: The varied impact of standards and technical regulations on 
export propensity 




















Information inquiry difficulty 
     -0.21*** 
(0.06) 























  -0.03* 
(0.02) 







Number of observations  163  143 
Log likelihood  -23.41  -30.42 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*** represents 5% significance level; ** represents 10%; * represents 15%. 
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5.1 What matters for market diversification? 
From the one-country case analysis, we find that a firm exports if its expected revenue 
exceeds not only its variable cost but also the standards-related fixed cost 
1 if  ( | )
0 if  ( | ) .
ij i i i ij ij
ij i i i ij ij
Yp q c Z q F





=⋅ ⋅ ≥ +
=⋅ ⋅ < +
 
With a choice set of N potential exporting destinations, a firm will export to any country in 
the subset , i A  where 
^
{| ( | ) } i ii j i i i i A jF F pq c Z q β
∗∗ ≡≤ ≡ ⋅ ⋅ − . Thus, the number of countries 
chosen as export destinations is characterized as  /[ (|) ] . ii i i i i nN F pq cZ q D β
−
∗∗ ∗ ≡⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − −  Our goal 
is to identify the factors that affect the probability that a firm diversifies its export to 
multiple markets, in particular the factors embedded in standards and technical regulations. 
 
We proceed with the estimation using an ordered discrete choice model of the form: 
.
′ ∗ + ′ + ′ + ⋅ ′ + ′ = i i i i i Z T X D n ε δ γ λ  
We adopt the ordered logit model for this ordinal discrete outcome framework with 
unobserved heterogeneity.
15 As shown in Table 4, the coefficient on "standards" shows up 
significant, indicating that standards are crucial in determining the number of markets 
firms export to. The negative coefficient implies that standards reduce exporters' likelihood 
of exporting to multiple markets. In contrast to section 4 in which standards are 
insignificant in explaining firms’ export propensity, they are an important factor in 
explaining firms’ market diversification. A possible explanation for this contrast, as 
considered in our model, may be that, to firms that export to more than one market, the 
compliance with each different standard across export markets requires a single fixed cost 
and thus leads to diseconomies of scale in their production.  Taking this into account, firms 
become cautious when deciding which and how many markets to export to. 
 
Because, in the ordered logit model, the marginal effects of the independent variables on 
                                                 
15When multinomial-choice variables are inherently ordered, such as voting outcomes, the 
multinomial logit or probit models would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent 
variable. The ordered probit and logit models have come into fairly wide uses as a framework for 
analyzing such responses. 
(10) 
(11) 20 
the probabilities associated with each outcome of the dependent variable (i.e., each value 
of  i n
∗) are not equal to the coefficients, the interpretation of these coefficients has to be 
careful. Consider one of the independent variables, "standards". To understand how 
standards affect the probability of exporting to  i n
∗   number of markets, we plot the 
probability distribution of  i n
∗ in Figure 2, where the solid curve represents firms that are 
not impacted by standards ("standards"=0) and the dashed curve represents firms that are 
impacted ("standards"=1). 
Table 4: The impact of standards and technical regulations 
on market diversification 
Dependent variable: the number of export markets 
Standards 





























Number of observations  161 
Log likelihood  -292.74 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*** represents 5% significance level; ** represents 10%; * represents 15%. 21 
As illustrated, the impact of standards is equivalent to shifting the distribution to the left.  
The effect of such shift is unambiguously moving some mass out of the rightmost cell, 
indicating a decline in the probabilities of exporting to more than five markets.  In other 
words, firms who receive impact of standards tend to concentrate their export activities in a 
smaller number of markets. 
 
Figure 2: The effect of standards on market diversification 
 
Table 5: The marginal effect of standards 
on market diversification 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 0]  0.0003 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 1]  0.0057 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 2]  0.0820 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 3]  0.0538 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 4]  0.1278 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 5]  0.0322 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 6]  -0.1415 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 7]  -0.0770 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 8]  -0.0088 
∆ Prob [ i n
∗= 9]  -0.0021 
 




































decision to export are computed and presented in Table 5.
16 Notice that the sum of these 
marginal effects at every level of market diversification should be equal to zero. It is found 
that, because of the impact of standards, the likelihood for a firm to export to more than 
five markets is 23% smaller, and the probability to export to more than three markets is 7% 
smaller. 
 
Furthermore, we find, in Table 4, that the coefficient of the variable "total employment" is 
statistically significant and equal to 0.34, implying that larger firms tend to export to more 
countries and have a more diversified structure of export markets. Contrast to our finding 
that young firms have a greater tendency of exporting, we find more mature firms are more 
likely to export to multiple markets. However, there is no clear evidence that wage rate, the 
amount of materials or the ownership structure is significant in determining the number of 
export markets. 
 
5.2 How does the impact on market diversification vary? 
The next question that naturally arises is: Are different types of firms equally affected in 
their export decisions by standards? For example, an informal interview with corporate 
executives, officers of trade associations and government officials, conducted by the 
United States International Trade Commission (1998), finds that standards constitute a 
particular trade restriction to firms which source inputs from numerous countries. The 
underlying reason is that, when the inputs are produced, their ultimate destination is 
unknown and thus they may not meet the technical requirements imposed in the market of 
the final product. Therefore, we separately look at the firms in our sample that import 
intermediate inputs from other countries (defined here as “outsourcing firms”) and 
examine whether these firms are particularly concerned with the standards and technical 
regulations in their final product’s markets when they decide on the number of export 
markets. 
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results. It is interesting to find that the impact of standards on 
export market diversification is considerably larger to firms that import their inputs, 
                                                 
16 Refer to Greene (1997) for a detailed description of the relevant computation methodology. 23 
suggested by the marked rise in the magnitude of the coefficient in Table 6 compared to 
Table 4. In fact, relative to an average firm, these firms are much less likely to diversify 
their export markets under the impact of standards. We conclude that importing inputs 
from numerous locations, which are produced without the standards in the ultimate 
destinations in consideration, makes the compliance with standards that differ across 
markets increasingly difficult and can impede firms' entry into more markets. 
 
Table 6: The impact of standards and technical regulations 
on market diversification for outsourcing firms 























      0.52*** 
(0.15) 
Wage 








Number of observations  102 
Log likelihood  -174.51 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*** represents 5% significance level; ** represents 10%; * represents 15%. 24 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we quantify the impact of standards and technical regulations imposed in 
developed countries on the export performance of firms in developing countries. The 
different types of technical regulations examined adversely affect firms in both their 
overall propensity to export and diversification of markets. 
 
First, we examine the impact of standards and technical regulations on firms' propensity to 
export. Firms that are impacted by testing procedures have a 9% smaller export share, and 
a 16% smaller export share if firms are domestically owned. On average, information 
access difficulty discourages exporters by 18% of their total sales. The length of inspection 
process significantly also reduces firms' export propensity. In particular, both testing 
procedures and lengthy inspection process constitute a greater concern to agricultural 
firms. 
 
With the ordered logit model, we estimate the marginal effects of technical requirements 
on firms' decision in the number of export markets. The firms whose abilities are affected 
by standards are 7% less likely to export to more than three markets. Firms that import 
inputs from numerous locations are much less likely to export to multiple markets than an 
average firm in the presence of standards. The findings support the fact that outsourcing 
inputs from numerous locations, when production takes place without the ultimate 
destination in mind, makes compliance with multiple standards more challenging, and thus 
hinders these firms' diversification of their export markets. 
 
Our findings suggest a number of considerations for exporting nations in efforts to address 
technical regulations imposed by importing countries. Negotiating on testing procedures 
towards mutual recognition with importing countries could stimulate exports. Building 
exporters' capacity in meeting standards, especially that of firms that outsource could help 
firms diversify their export markets and improve the stability of their sales given the 
uncertainty in international markets. Facilitating information exchange with importing 
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